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I. Introduction
I am going to talk today about perhaps the most basic question we ask about
interest groups – why they lobby. Answering this seemingly obvious question has
become surprisingly difficult in light of recent research findings. I will certainly not
provide a complete answer today. But I will outline a macro-level theoretical frame-
work for developing such an answer, an approach that can be described as a contextu-
al theory of the politics of organized interests.
Two introductory comments are warranted, however, before continuing. First, to
be more precise, I am going to talk about organized interests rather than interest
groups. The majority of interest “groups” lobbying today, quite simply, are not
groups, but institutions – firms, other governments, and even universities. When lob-
bying on their own behalf, these institutions pursue relatively narrow corporate inter-
ests rather than the collective interests of members, whether they are individuals, as in
an environmental group, or institutions, as in a trade association (Salisbury 1984).
Second, I think it necessary to comment on why the politics of organized interests
is an appropriate subject for a Professor of Public Administration. Organized inter-
ests, of course, are a natural, even a core topic of Political Science, and both my train-
ing and much of my career to date are firmly rooted in that discipline. Still, the disci-
pline of Public Administration has at least two reasons for independently exploring
organized interests.
First, perhaps the central issue facing Public Administration over the last century
– from Woodrow Wilson’s (1887) initial articulation of the politics-administration
dichotomy, through the post-War work of Herbert Simon (1945), Paul Appleby
(1949), and Dwight Waldo (1955), to current debates over principal-agent models
(Moe 1984) – has concerned reconciling the hierarchical traits of the administrative
process with the necessity of democratic control. Public Administration scholars,
therefore, routinely discuss the influence of legislatures, judges, and executives on
administration (Fredrickson and Smith 2003: 15-40). Yet, despite widespread, if
implicit, recognition that organized interests potentially shape both policy agendas
and policy implementation, few Public Administration scholars independently con-
sider the structure of interest communities or how organized interests choose among
influence tactics. In order to get on to our main topic, I will simply assert that if we
are to develop a robust theoretical reconciliation of public administration and demo-
cratic legitimation, then we must more actively consider the politics of organized
interests.
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A second rationale for Public Administration attention to organized interests is a
bit more indirect, but firmly rooted in our long-standing, core interest in organiza-
tion theory. Much of organization theory, of course, is concerned about the design
and management of individual organizations. This work has been labeled closed or
micro-level organization theory. But an extensive literature has developed over the
last thirty years taking a more macro-level approach to understand how environmen-
tal forces influence variations in organization structures and behaviors across organi-
zational populations. This approach tends to focus on the demographic processes of
selection and adaptation within communities of organizations and is perhaps best
represented by the work of W. Richard Scott (2001), Michael Hannan and John
Freeman (1989), and Howard Aldrich (1999). Their research has generated a number
of interesting insights. But empirical analysis of organizational environments has
faced a rather severe constraint. That is, organizations come in all sizes and flavors,
from tiny mom and pop grocery stores to giants like Ford Motor Company, from vol-
untary organizations like consumer groups to inherently coercive public institutions
like prisons. This very diversity creates an apples and oranges problem making the
task of meaningful comparison at best very difficult (Knoke, Marsden, and Kalleberg
2002). But when all of these many different kinds of organizations interface with
government via lobbying, they are all placed on a common footing by having a com-
mon task. Indeed, the lobbying task is perhaps the only concrete function even
potentially common to all organizations. Thus, lobbying provides one of the few
venues in which to empirically evaluate theories about the impact of organizational
environments while controlling for the inherent diversity within organizational popu-
lations.
With these caveats in mind, we can now turn to why organizations lobby. I will
first discuss why this has become such an interesting question. I will then outline
several tentative answers to the question. And third, I will outline a theoretical
framework for sorting through these tentative answers. I will conclude with some
observations about the potential utility of this framework and, more generally, about
the importance of context in understanding organizational behavior.
II. The Paradox of Lobbying
The problem of understanding why organizations lobby grows directly from the
evolution of the literature on organized interests over the last several decades.
Indeed, there have been two broad revolutions in our understanding of the politics of
organized interests over the post-War era. But the starting point is pluralist theory as
developed by Robert Dahl (1961) and, especially, David Truman (1951). In their
view, explaining why organizations lobby was not problematic. Like minded individ-
uals naturally come together in response to disturbances in the policy environment.
But in this fundamentally instrumental view, lobbying was highly constrained in a
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manner than made it an essential support of rather than a threat to democratic gov-
ernment. The population of organized interests formed in response to policy distur-
bances was assumed to validly reflect the distribution of salient interests in society.
While there is surely an inequality of resources available to different organizations,
few are without access to any means of pursuing influence (Dahl 1967, 130). The
influence tactics then employed were viewed as benign, largely providing technical
information to elected officials (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963; Milbrath 1963). Given
election-induced attention to constituents’ preferences, this information could influ-
ence elected officials only insofar as it facilitated a better reflection of those prefer-
ences. The resulting policy outcomes thus reflected the will of the public, if perhaps
weighted by issue salience (Truman 1951; Dahl 1961; 1967; Key 1964). True to the
larger pluralist enterprise, therefore, the formation and operation of organized inter-
ests was largely viewed as supportive of democratic government.
The first revolution in thinking about organized interests entailed an almost com-
plete rejection of this benign view. Virginia Gray and I (2004) have labeled this
approach the transactions perspective because narrowly defined exchanges character-
ize relationships among political actors throughout the influence process. Perhaps
most significantly, Mancur Olson’s (1965) description of the collective action prob-
lem undermined Truman’s (1951) notion that organized interests form naturally.
Rather, since interests alone provide insufficient incentives to mobilize, selective
incentives are traded for participation. But given variations in the severity of the col-
lective action problem and access to resources through which to provide selective
incentives, the population of lobbying organizations will almost certainly poorly
reflect the distribution of interests in society. Instead, the interest system will be
biased in favor of small groups with significant stakes in policy (Schattschneider
1960; Schlozman and Tierney 1986). This nonrepresentative sample of interests in
society is then expected to purchase policy via lobbying. The transactions orientation
inevitably concludes that government policy is captured by special interests (Stigler
1971; Peltzman 1976; Mitchell and Munger 1991). In its most extreme versions,
organized interests are assumed to act like shoppers in a grocery store, interacting
hardly at all while lining-up to sequentially and with certainty purchase goods even
until the store’s shelves are bare (Olson 1982; Mueller 1983). As a result, the transac-
tions perspective viewed organized interests as pervasive threats to democratic gover-
nance.
A second revolution – the neopluralist perspective – developed over the 1990s as
empirical findings accumulated in sharp contrast to transactions theory expectations
(Lowery and Gray 2004; McFarland 2004). Indeed, neopluralist research undermined
the transactions perspective at every stage of the influence production process,
although without returning to the overly benign assessment of traditional pluralists.
For example, we all now acknowledge Olson's collective action problem. But new
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research indicates that it is not as severe as Olson thought (Hansen 1985; Moe 1980),
and leaders of organized interests employ a variety of creative means to overcome free
riding, including reliance on purposive and solidary incentives that tap some of the
same motivations cited by pluralists (Clark and Wilson 1961; Berry 1999; Walker
1991). This research does not mean that the collective action problem is unimpor-
tant. But it is not so severe nor solutions so rare that the analysis of mobilization
should stop with noting it (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 75). In broader terms, this
means that many different types of organizations will enter lobbying communities
reflecting a broad array of interests in society.
Even more telling for our purpose, neopluralist research has often highlighted the
uncertainty and ineffectiveness of influence tactics. Many who enter the lobbying
supermarket to purchase policy are disappointed. Consider some of the key research
findings of the last decade.
● John Heinz, Edward Laumann, Robert Nelson, and Robert Salisbury’s 1993 book,
The Hollow Core, described the world of lobbying as lacking nearly any of the
certainty of a supermarket with its well defined roles, goals, and prices. Rather,
the lobbying environment is one governed by extraordinary uncertainty in goals,
means, and especially the relationships between them.
● Mark Smith’s 2000 book, American Business and Political Power, found that when
business interests are united in actively supporting a policy proposal, the likeli-
hood of Congress acceding to their wishes are markedly diminished.
● Ken Kollman’s 1998 book, Outside Lobbying, highlighted the public opinion con-
text behind the selection of lobbying tactics, finding that direct lobbying in the
face of public opinion opposition has little effect on legislators.
● Benjamin Page, Robert Shapiro, and Glenn Dempsey’s (1987) analysis of business
lobbying of the public via media advocacy more often than not had the opposite
of the intended effect.
● Nor is this evidence limited to work on US national government. Virginia Gray
and I, with several of our students, found that the number and diversity of inter-
ests lobbying state legislatures have only a marginal influence on overall policy
liberalism (Gray, Lowery, Fellowes, and McAtee 2004) or the adoption of health
care policies (Gray, Lowery, and Godwin 2004; 2005). In terms of agendas, the
density and diversity of interest systems are far more determined by the size and
diversity of legislative agendas than the reverse (Gray, Lowery, Fellowes, and
Anderson in press).
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● Also, Elizabeth Gerber’s 1999 analysis of referendum voting in The Populist
Paradox found that massive infusions of cash into state referendum campaigns by
business interests promoting policies favorable to them almost always fail to move
voters.
● Finally, none of these specific studies is unique. While the empirical literature
remains mixed with some studies supporting elements of the transactions
school’s supermarket hypothesis, two major surveys of the literature conducted
over the last decade – by Richard Smith (1995) and Frank Baumgartner and Beth
Leech (1998) – reached remarkably similar conclusions. These were best summa-
rized by Baumgartner and Leech’s (1998, 134) statement that, "the unavoidable
conclusion is that PACs and direct lobbying sometimes strongly influence
Congressional voting, sometimes have marginal influence, and sometimes fail to
exert influence."  
These findings highlight the difficulty of lobbying in the face of an attentive pub-
lic with strong preferences. This conclusion is often viewed as surprising and even
implausible by those less familiar with the recent work on organized interests. Our
general expectation, perhaps based as much on a steady diet of journalistic horror
stories as on theoretical arguments of the transactions model, is that special interests
routinely exercise undue influence. Yet, the large n studies of the 1990s almost uni-
formly failed to find consistent evidence of extensive influence on the part of organ-
ized interests.
Or rather, they failed to find evidence of significant influence where we might expect
it to be most likely – when vast numbers of organizations engage in titanic battles
over large, new issues, spending fortunes and employing hundreds of lobbyists to
influence public officials. In contrast, our best evidence of influence arises from quite
different settings – when only one or a handful of organizations lobby on a narrow,
technical issue of little concern to the public (Smith 1995; Smith 2000; Witko in
press). This is especially true for venues that are less accessible to public inspection,
such as regulatory decisions implementing legislation (Yackee 2004) or when pro-
grams are revised rather then when they are adopted (Gray, Lowery, and Godwin
2004). Also well funded business interests seem to be more effective at stopping
threatening proposals than in promoting favorable policies (Gerber 1999).
This, then, is the paradox of lobbying; beyond a threshold of an absence of lobbying,
the influence of organized interests – all other things equal – seems to be negatively
associated with the scope of lobbying battles as measured by the number of organiza-
tions involved, the intensity of their lobbying, and how attentive the public is.
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Imre Lakatos (1970) argued that one of the essential hallmarks of healthy
research programs is the generation of new research problems. The neopluralist
research program has no shortage of these. The most important include a new
appreciation of significant linkages and feedbacks between the stages of the influence
process – how mobilization processes influence and are influenced by the demogra-
phy of interest populations and how both in turn influence and are influenced by the
selection of influence tactics and strategies. We will, in fact, return to these linkages
and feedbacks a bit later. For now though, I wish to focus on perhaps the most sig-
nificant research question raised by the neopluralist research program. It is really the
most basic question of all. Why do organizations lobby?  Or as the authors of The
Hollow Core (1993, 369) wrote, “Given the uncertainty of the benefits, why then
should interest groups continue to invest in private representation?” Lobbying makes
little sense if, when entering the transactions theorists’ supermarket with an ever larg-
er shopping cart and ever fatter wallet, one leaves the store with ever fewer goods.
III. Several Candidate Explanations
So, why do organized interests lobby?  Consider four types of answers. The first is
perhaps the most surprising in the face of the seemingly exponential growth of inter-
est populations in recent decades (Gray and Lowery 1996). While lobbyist popula-
tions have doubled and then doubled again over the last 25 years, few organizations
that might lobby actually do so. Less than half of one percent of California’s nearly
50,000 manufacturing firms, for example, registered to lobby the California legisla-
ture in 1997 (Lowery, Gray, Anderson, and Newmark 2004), and the California
Manufacturing Association still has fewer than 900 members. The missing-in-action
can include even very large corporations. Until the mid-1990s, for example,
Microsoft – the largest corporation in the world by some measures – did not lobby
(Lowery and Brasher 2004, 85). Lobbying is a rare event too if we switch our atten-
tion to the issues being lobbied. Baumgartner and Leech’s (2001) analysis of lobby
disclosure reports on 137 issues considered by the US Congress found that the modal
number of organizations lobbying on an issue was zero, a mode applicable to over 40
percent of legislative proposals. Indeed, most lobbying is concentrated on only a few
proposals considered by legislatures.
Most organizations eschew the status of interest organizations and most issues are
not lobbied. This is not surprising from Truman’s (1951) pluralist model or, if one
needs a modern formal reinstatement of pluralism, Denzau and Munger’s (1986)
analysis of how the unorganized are represented. Organizations need not lobby if
they are satisfied with the status quo or if governmental actors have sufficient incen-
tives to represent their interests even without active lobbying. This means, of course,
that we will have to reframe our question to some extent. That is, rather than all or
many organizations becoming trapped in the paradox of lobbying, why do some
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organizations engage in titanic influence battles that are more often lost than won?
This reformulation is still an important question given that it is on such battles that
the bulk of lobbying takes place, the largest sums spent, and the public’s suspicions
most focused. As an aside, however, it is worth noting that this picture of lobbying as
a somewhat rare phenomenon hints at its real, if hidden, effectiveness. The neoplu-
ralist model does not deny that lobbying is effective, only that it is most likely to
secure policy returns when few organizations are engaged on issues out of public
sight. Such situations are not uncommon.
Second, much of lobbying is instrumental in a narrow sense. While Microsoft did
not lobby prior to 1995, by 1998 it had a Washington Office and spent $2.12 million
in lobbying using nine different contract lobbying firms. This might seem like a lot
of activity, but by 2000, expenditures increased to $6.36 million with 15 lobbying
firms working for Microsoft. From 1994 to the 2000 election cycle, Microsoft’s soft
money, PAC, and individual employee contributions to political campaigns increased
from $109,134 to $4,701,631 (Lowery and Brasher 2004, 85). This was all clearly
instrumental behavior given Clinton Justice Department efforts to prosecute
Microsoft as a monopolist. Similarly, severe policy threats to tobacco companies had
to be answered, even if the prospects of success were low (Wright 2004). Indeed,
most lobbying organizations are short-term visitors to the policy process, entering the
world of politics for quite specific reasons and then leaving as the policy cycle is com-
pleted (Gray and Lowery 1995). But such instrumental behavior does not account for
repeat participation in major policy struggles in which vast sums of money are spent
and armies of lobbyists are deployed. A more complete answer is needed.
So, a third set of answers views lobbying as essentially non-rational activity, non-
rational at least in terms of the narrowly instrumental interpretations of the pluralist
and transaction models. Olson (1965), for example, viewed lobbying as a by-product
of reliance on selective incentives to overcome free riding. If lobbying is a by-product
of non-issue based mobilization, then organization leaders are free to lobby on what-
ever ideological hobbyhorse interests them with little need to provide policy returns
to members. Alternatively, as illustrated by lobbyist Jack Abramoff ’s fleecing of the
Louisiana Coushatta Tribe while claiming to protect their gambling interests
(Schmidt 2005), lobbying may be a scam perpetuated by highly informed agents on
poorly informed principals with the object being extracting cash more than changing
public policy. It is also possible that current lobbying may be merely a legacy of past
instrumental lobbying. We have seen that Microsoft transformed itself from a lobby-
ing pygmy to a giant when faced with real threats to its existence. But Microsoft did
not leave town when the incoming Bush team stopped the prosecution. Surely,
Microsoft retains its lobbying capacity primarily as a form of insurance against future
threats. But once established, these resources might as well be used to lobby on a
wide variety of issues – none of which alone might have been sufficient to induce
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Microsoft to begin lobbying in the first place. Finally, well funded lobbying battles do
not always fail, even if success is far from guaranteed. If so, and with sufficiently large
stakes (Gerber 1999, 137), then even rare victories may act as a variable reinforcement
schedule, whereby it pays to always try to influence policy because one can never
know when such efforts might be successful.
There is, I think, much to be said for this third set of explanations. We can easily
point to examples that are consistent with each. But while neopluralist research,
especially that reported in The Hollow Core, suggests that interest organizations, their
members and patrons, and their lobbyists are uncertain about their goals and are less
than fully informed about the governmental process and the actions of their policy
adversaries than is commonly assumed in the transactions model (Ainsworth 2002),
it would seem implausible to assume the lobbying is dominated by non- or extra-
rational considerations. Contrary to the by-product theory, membership groups do
not commonly lobby on issues tangential to the interests of their members. And
those participating in lobbying typically have large stakes involved and spend consid-
erable resources in trying to influence public policy. While sometimes ideologically
driven, lobbying has become a highly professional activity in which knowledge and
information are vital resources to be developed and nurtured. It seems, then, that
this should be an arena in which rational linkages of means and ends should govern
behavior. Thus, I think it unlikely that we can account for why organizations lobby
by simple reference to extra-rational considerations.
A fourth and more comprehensive explanation highlights the complexity of the
influence process. More specifically, the large-n studies associated with the neoplural-
ist research program have routinely emphasized two observations. The first is that
lobbying behaviors are often driven by multiple goals, all of which, however, are
closely related to each other. This claim may seem, on its face, obvious. It is not at all
obvious, however, given prior empirical analyses embedded in the pluralist and trans-
actions models, which typically focus on a final decision on a single policy where
competition is typically defined quite narrowly as between, for example, environmen-
tal groups and manufacturing firms. Moreover, issues associated with earlier stages of
the influence process, such as mobilization or maintenance issues or securing agenda
space in which to consider a proposal, are assumed to have been solved in ways that
have little bearing on final decisions.
The neopluralist perspective, in contrast, has found significant linkages among
the various stages of the influence production process. For example, differential rates
of mobilization strongly structure the density and diversity of interest communities
(Lowery and Gray 1998b), which in turn strongly influence the range of lobbying tac-
tics that can be employed effectively (Hojnacki 1997; Kollman 1998; Goldstein 1999;
Gerber 1999; Gray and Lowery 1997a; 1998). Moreover, there are significant feed-
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backs among these activities. Thus, the size and structure of the interest community
acts in a density dependent manner to relax or intensify constraints on mobilization
(Lowery and Gray 1995; Gray and Lowery 2001b). There is also evidence that use of
particular lobbying tactics can influence the life chances of organizations, thereby
influencing the structure and size of interest communities (Gray, Lowery, and Wolak
2004). And echoing Truman's (1951) disturbance theory, neopluralist research is
strongly grounded on the notion that policy outcomes influence mobilization rates,
the structure of interest populations, and levels and types of influence activities
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Heinz et. al. 1993; Lowery and Gray 1995). Further,
lobbying on one issue that may be less than central to an interest organization may be
vital to securing support from political elites or coalition allies on issues the organiza-
tion does care about. In short, the influence production process is not a sausage that
can be neatly sliced to isolate single, final issues.
If the several stages of the influence production process are linked in complex
ways, then it is quite plausible that lobbying may be less about winning than some
other purpose.
● When the National Organization for Women lobbies on a highly salient issue like
President Bush’s judicial nominations, it almost certainly realizes that it will lose
many more votes than it wins. But maintaining a fierce profile on judicial nomi-
nations has proven to be a very effective tool in retaining members and securing
new members.
● When Christian Right organizations lobby the US Congress in support of
President Bush’s proposal to privatize Social Security, it is likely less a conse-
quence of any deep commitment to dismantling the New Deal program than in
exchange for more energetic support by the Bush Administration of proposals to
limit abortion and restrict gay rights (Peterson 1992).
● When Common Cause abruptly switched its lobbying agenda from good govern-
ment reform issues to opposing the MX missile program, it likely did so not
because its leaders expected to win or because its members cared deeply about the
proposal, but because a few patrons who supplied the lion share of the organiza-
tion’s funds did care deeply (Rothenberg 1992).
● When the National Rifle Association lobbied in opposition of the initial Brady
Bill ban on assault weapons, it was unlikely to win given strong public support for
the proposal. But its opposition surely pre-empted several smaller, even more
radical gun rights organizations from securing more prominent roles in repre-
senting what they assert to be the interests of gun owners.
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In short, because the processes of mobilization, organizational maintenance, and
political influence are related to each other, and because political behaviors by interest
organizations on different issues are also linked to each other for strategic reasons,
identifying a simple and straightforward relationship between lobbying and final pol-
icy decisions may prove elusive.
The second observation of the neopluralist research program questions a key ele-
ment of the lobbying paradox as defined earlier, that the influence of organized inter-
ests – all other things equal – is negatively associated with the scope of lobbying bat-
tles. The part questioned is the assumption that all things are equal. They rarely are.
Indeed, if there is a central message in neopluralist research, it is that context matters
(Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 177-180). Choices about what issues to lobby and
what tactics to employ as well as the likelihood of their success depend on the institu-
tions that allow or impede access, the public opinion context in which debates take
place, and what other organized interests are also lobbying the issue. Again, this may
seem very obvious. But such attention to context was, in fact, quite uncommon until
recently. As Baumgartner and Leech (1998, 176) noted from their survey of articles
in the American Political Science Review, “the modal type of interest group study in
the premier journal of political science over the postwar period is a cross-sectional
comparison of a few groups working on a single issue at one point in time. Such a
research approach seems a perfect strategy for producing unexplained variation
between studies. It is a recipe,” they note, “for the creation of a contradictory and
noncumulative literature.” In other words, the research designs of many studies of
interest organizations defined away critical elements of context.
In contrast, the large-n studies of neopluralist research, precisely because they
look at many organized interests, many jurisdictions, and/or many issues, are inher-
ently attentive to context. Consider three key findings of this research.
● First, public opinion matters. We have already discussed Ken Kollman’s (1998)
work which demonstrates that the effectiveness of inside and outside lobby tactics
depends greatly on how popular and salient issues are. But popularity and
salience are not constants. Baumgartner and Jones’ (1993) punctuated equilibri-
um theory of the policy process, for example, highlights how the changing
salience and popularity of issues alters venues and the prospects of success in lob-
bying over time. And such variation is at least potentially subject to at least some
manipulation via framing. Jack Wright (2004), for example, examined the impact
of PAC contributions on dozens of Congressional votes on tobacco policy.
Consistent with much of neopluralist work, the millions of dollars spend by Big
Tobacco on campaign contributions and lobbying had almost no impact on vot-
ing, in large part because bashing tobacco is popular. The few exceptions, howev-
er, concerned agriculture bills where support could be framed in terms of a rival
popular issue – support for family farms.
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● Second, institutions matter. Perhaps most importantly, the venue in which lobby-
ing takes place matters a great deal, as illustrated by the tremendous success of the
religious right in the United States in lobbying via electoral campaigns, but its rel-
ative failure to turn that success into legislation. In the former venue, the drag of
the general unpopularity of the policy agenda of the religious right could be
avoided by targeting selective Congressional campaigns, but not so in legislatures
(Green and Bigelow 2005). Similarly, while business interests often fair poorly in
legislative settings (Smith 2000) and referendum voting (Gerber 1999), they are
far more successful in influencing the design of implementing regulations, a set-
ting in which technical information carries far more weight than salience and
popularity (Yackee 2003). The importance of venue becomes especially clear
when we consider the sequencing of the series of decisions required to change
policy. Indeed, the lobbying task, and thereby the definition of lobbying success,
shifts as organized interests move from initially competing for the scare time and
energy of legislative champions with other organizations and issues also support-
ed by the legislator to persuading the undecided and even policy opponents as
final voting nears (Hall and Wayman 1990; Hojnacki 2000; Hojnacki and Kimball
1998; 1999; 2001; Witko in press).
● Third, size matters. There are quite real variations in the economies of scale gov-
erning how the number and distribution of interests in society are translated into
numbers and distributions of lobbying organizations. A series of studies that I
have conducted with Virginia Gray and our students, for example, demonstrate
that the severity of the collective action problem, the mortality of organized inter-
ests, and the composition of interest communities varies systematically – if in
complex ways – with the size of political jurisdictions (Gray and Lowery 1996a;
1997;a Lowery and Gray 1998a; Lowery, Gray, and Fellowes 2005). These in turn
influence the kinds of influence tactics organizations employ (Gray and Lowery
1995a; 1998) and the difficulty of passing legislation (Gray and Lowery 1995b).
Holding institutions and opinion constant, the mix of organized interests pro-
moting alternative policies, the tactics they use, and the difficulty of passing leg-
islative will change moving from a smaller to a larger state.
So, why do interest organizations lobby in the face of considerable uncertainty
that their efforts will succeed in terms of securing or preventing desired legislation or
regulation?  To date, neopluralist research suggests that organizations lobby for many
different reasons, not just to pass or block policy initiatives. Moreover, the severity of
these several lobbying tasks and, therefore, the likelihood of their efforts being suc-
cessful are highly contingent given variation in the opinion, institutional, and juris-
dictional size contexts in which they lobby.
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IV. A Theoretical Framework 
As plausible as this answer is, it is as yet unsatisfactory. The problem is that our
explanation emphasizing multiple goals and contextual forces is largely an ad hoc,
retrospective reinterpretation of a variety of empirical findings whose only truly
shared characteristic is their inconsistency with transactions model expectations. As a
result, we have a laundry list of goals and contextual factors that seem to be impor-
tant without any general theoretical framework within which to think about these
and related variables in the prospective sense of suggesting testable hypotheses. At
present, in fact, we cannot answer several very basic questions about how multiple
goals and contextual forces influence lobbying. For example, we have no theory that
can tell us when a particular goal – mobilizing members, securing patron financial
support, gaining access to legislative champions, or winning a final policy vote – will
come to dominate an interest organization’s decisions about who to lobby on what
and how. Similarly, we have no theory accounting for variation in contextual forces
and how they come to dominate these and related decisions. So, while the neoplural-
ist research program has done a great deal to highlight the importance of multiple
goals and contextual forces, much remains to be done if we are to develop a multi-
goal, multi-context theory of lobbying.
Critically, such a theory should be constructed from the perspective of the organi-
zation. This may be a controversial recommendation since scholarship on organized
interests employs a variety of sampling frames, more often focusing on the issues
being lobbied, the lobbyists themselves, or decisions at specific stages of the policy
process than on the organizations doing – or, importantly, not doing – the lobbying.
But it is organizations that make decisions to lobby and how to do so. It is the organ-
izations that have multiple goals that specify a variety or purposes for lobbying.
Accordingly, as Kenneth Goldstein (1999, 128) noted, “Future work on interest group
strategies must proceed from a proper theoretical understanding of exactly what lob-
byists are trying to accomplish.” Indeed, a theory of lobbying grounded on the incen-
tives of organizations should parallel David Mayhew’s (1974) theory of legislative
behavior, which is founded on the pursuit of electoral security. In the same manner,
the most fundamental goal of organizations must be to survive as organizations. All
of the other goals that organizations might have are necessarily secondary considera-
tions since failure to survive will preclude achieving any of them.
Given a focus on organizational survival, two theories seem especially useful vehi-
cles for constructing a theory of lobbying. The first is niche theory, which was initial-
ly developed by Evelyn Hutchinson to understand the diversity of biological species.
Niche analysis looks at the relationship between a population or organism and vari-
ables in the environment that bear on survival. Niche analysis has since become com-
mon in organization ecology (Baum and Singh 1994; 1996), and Virginia Gray and I
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(1996a) and others (Wilson 1973; Browne 1990) have already applied it to the study
of organized interests to some degree. In niche analysis, each vital environmental
resource is conceptualized as an array. “In this way,” noted Hutchinson (1957, 416),
“an n-dimensional hypervolume is defined, every point of which corresponds to a
state in the environment which would permit the species S1 to exist indefinitely.” The
space so defined constitutes the “fundamental niche” of the species, the space in
which it might survive. But given competition with similar species or organisms or
organizations over shared resource arrays, the realized niche of most species is merely
a portion of each resource array defining its fundamental niche. The niche concept
serves as a capstone concept in population biology by linking many other core ideas
such as competition, selection, the isomorphism principle, fitness, selection, and
adaptation.
As applied to organized interests, niche theory requires that we specify the
resources that might enable a lobbying organization to survive, such as members if
the organization is a membership group or patrons if an institution, financial
resources, access to decision makers, and issues on which to lobby. Given competi-
tion over these resources with other organized interests, an organization’s core task is
to construct a viable realized niche comprised of some portion of each of the
resource arrays constituting its fundamental niche. Should its space on any one
resource array shrink below the level sufficient to sustain the organization, it will
cease to exist.
Two aspects of niche theory are important for our current purpose. First, the
several resource arrays of the fundamental niche can be viewed as defining the multi-
ple goals that the organization might pursue when lobbying – retaining old members
while encouraging new members to join, securing patron financial support, securing
the services of a legislative champion, maintaining a favorable public opinion climate,
or even securing a final policy outcome. Second, niche theory suggests that the deter-
mination of which goal or goals come to dominate the selection of lobbying targets
and lobbying tactics depends critically on which of the several resource arrays the
organization faces the most severe challenge from competitors.
● Thus, a membership organization that is hemorrhaging members may have to
shift from lobbying on narrow but potentially achievable policy goals to lobbying
on hot button issues that stimulate joining, even if moving those issues in a favor-
able direction is unlikely.
● An organization with starkly weak public opinion support may have to shift from
direct or inside lobbying on issues the members really care about to long-term,
fuzzier outside lobbying in order to create a more favorable decision environ-
ment.
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● A membership organization with a solid membership base but weak finances may
have to tailor its selection of lobbying issues so at better reflect the preferences of
a few deep pocket patrons rather than issues preferred by mass members or
organization leaders.
● Indeed, if the existence of an organization, like Microsoft or a tobacco company,
is in fact fundamentally threatened by a proposed change in policy, it will have no
choice but to lobby in pursuit of final policy outcomes irrespective of the odds
going into the fight. In this sense, purely instrumental policy lobbying can be
accounted for as merely one of a broader range of lobbying modes, each deter-
mined by the search for a viable realized niche.
In sum, the nature of the competition on the several resource arrays will deter-
mine which of several lobbying goals actually guides the decision to lobby, the choice
of lobby targets, and the selection among available influence tools. Thus, niche theo-
ry can do much of the work of transforming our post hoc suspicions that lobbying is
conducted for multiple purposes into a prospective tool with which to extract testable
hypotheses.
As currently framed, however, niche theory is quite static. Arrays of environmen-
tal resources and competition over them are largely viewed as fixed. This is fine for
the biological sciences in which niche theory developed given that sponges and snails
are generally thought to be in relatively stable long-term relationships with their envi-
ronments. This is population biology’s isomorphism principle. In such settings, we
do not so much see on-going competition as the temporally stable outcome of past
competition. Political environments, however, are much more dynamic. Also, niche
theory is fundamentally about competition among similar organizations or organ-
isms. This is an important corrective to most of the literature, which often frames
competition solely in terms of final policy opponents, such as between environmen-
talists and manufacturers, when the most direct threat to an environmental group’s
existence as an organization is another environmental group. Still, there are other
actors involved in lobbying – the public, political elites, policy opponents, and so on –
who may well influence the structure of the resource arrays comprising an organized
interests fundamental niche and, thereby, the level of competition it faces from simi-
lar organizations in constructing a viable realized niche.
To address these limitations, we can turn to some of the insights of resource
dependency theory. As developed by Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald Salancik in their 1978
book, The External Control of Organizations, resources dependency theory shares
much with niche theory. Both assume that organizations must first survive to accom-
plish any other task, that securing environmental resources is essential for organiza-
tions to survive, and that, therefore, organizations must interact with their environ-
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ment (Mizruchi and Yoo 2002, 602). To this, resource dependence theory adds the
insight that those who control vital external resources – whether they are similar
organizations or some other set of actors – have at least the potential to shape an
organization’s behavior by threatening to withhold access to them. Indeed, those
controlling vital external resources can exercise considerable control over an organi-
zation.
This brings us back to the contextual forces influencing lobbying. Resource
dependence theory may allow us to consider the influence of other actors in account-
ing for why organizations lobby as they do. The contextual forces of public opinion,
institutions, the density and diversity of interest communities associated with juris-
diction size, and perhaps other variables, can be viewed from the perspective of niche
theory as either lengthening or shortening the resource arrays from which organized
interests must construct viable realized niches. Some of these contextual influences
are, of course, fixed by the environment. Public opinion on at least some issues, for
example, is determined exogenously and only weakly subject to political manipula-
tion via framing. The jurisdictional boundaries that delimit the number and diversity
of interest in society that might be represented politically is largely a fixed attribute of
lobbying environments, if no less important for being so. Still, other contextual
forces are more subject to design and manipulation. Resource dependency theory
suggests that such dependence may give other actors considerable influence over an
interest organization’s lobbying decisions.
● For example, institutions specify who may have access to decision makers, the
order in which they must be addressed, the kinds of evidence that can be used,
and so on. At the extreme, access may be defined so narrowly that there is no
viable space on the access array and an interest organization cannot survive.
Resource dependency theory suggests that political elites who, at the constitution-
al level, specify how decisions are made and then make those decisions should
exercise considerable control over the life prospects of organizations, thereby
determining which organizational goals will most closely guide decisions about
lobbying.
● Similarly, whether interest systems are designed in a manner allowing many simi-
lar organizations to compete or are structured so that only a few have access is
likely to have a significant impact on the life chances of an organization. The
political elites who design these institutions so that few or many competitors
materialize necessarily exercise some degree of control over the organization and
may influence which goals govern decisions about lobbying.
● And institutions are designed so as to allow greater or lesser popular influence on
policy via requiring voting in referendums or legislative bodies or decisions with-
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in a bureaucracy. The design of these institutions significantly influences the
nature of the lobbying task. When designed so that public opinion matters a
great deal, the public is likely to exercise significant control over both lobbying
outcomes and, thereby, how lobbying organizations define the lobbying task and
implement lobbying strategies.
The key point is that resource dependence theory allows us to add contextual
forces to niche theory in a way highlighting the importance of a wider array of actors
in the political environment.
This combination of niche and resource dependence theory is, of course,
extremely abstract. It is not so abstract, however, that testable hypotheses cannot be
derived. For example, political elites should have a greater ability to mobilize organ-
ized interests to lobby on behalf of the elites’ preferred policy agenda rather than that
of the interest organization itself when institutions limit access to the political
process. In large, dense interest communities, enhanced organizational mortality
rates should encourage membership groups to lobby more on hot button issues to
enhance membership rolls. Prominent events crystallizing public opinion – such as
the Columbine school shootings in the United States – should compel pro-gun inter-
ests to shift from in-side to out-side lobbying and anti-gun interests from out-side to
in-side lobbying. And most commonly, when public policy or the pursuit of public
policy is not vital to an organization, it will not become an interest organization.
These and related hypotheses are perhaps not strictly novel insights of the theory I
have outlined. What is novel is seeing that they all result from a common underlying
process of resource dependence associated with organizational survival.
Also, abstractness is one of the potential strengths of the theory I have outlined in
terms of comparative analysis. By and large, research on the politics of organized
interests has relied on quite concrete theories not far removed from the cases used to
probe them empirically. This has had a number of unfortunate consequences. One
that I am most interested in is the sharp separation between the European continental
and Anglo-American literatures on organized interests. The former is deeply rooted in
corporatist and neo-corporatist theories (Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1982), while the
latter has roots in the open systems of traditional pluralism and transactions models.
On the surface, there seems to be good reason to rely on fundamentally different kinds
of theories to account for behavior in what appear to be two very different interest sys-
tems. Lobbying in Washington certainly does not look like lobbying in Vienna.
Still, interest representation is a task all democratic states must undertake, which
suggests that we should develop a general theory of interest representation. I think
that combining niche theory and resource dependency theory might provide such a
framework. That is, corporatist arrangements are systems of interest representation
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in which the access resource array is so shortened by design that only a few organized
interests survive – the peak associations in tri-partite bargaining. More to the point,
as illustrated by the work of Alan Sairoff (1999), corporatism is a variable on which
the United States and other pluralist countries merely have very low scores. Pluralism
too is a variable on which corporatist nations have comparable low scores. The full
range of both should be the focus of our theories. This suggests that an especially
useful aspect of building a multi-goal, multi-context theory of lobbying is that it
might allow us to construct a genuinely comparative literature on the politics of
organized interests.
V. Conclusion
So, why do organizations lobby in the face of great odds against their ever being
successful in securing final policy outcomes?  Organizations lobby for many different
reasons, not all of which concern the immediate passage of laws or the adoption of
regulations. As with simple instrumental lobbying, these other purposes come to the
fore when they are related to scarce resources that are vital to an organization’s sur-
vival as an organization. Indeed, resources are scarce in a world in which lobby regis-
trants turnover at a tremendous rate. For example, nearly half of all lobby registrants
in the American states disappear from lobby rolls in only a few short years (Gray and
Lowery 1996b; 1997b). Under such conditions of pervasive resource threat, non-
instrumental reasons for lobbying – non-instrumental at least in a final policy sense –
are likely to be quite common. Among the forces determining the scarcity or abun-
dance of an organization’s resource environment are a variety of contextual forces,
including the level of competition expected from similar organizations, the substan-
tive content of public opinion, how the decision process accommodates its influence,
and institutional rules that regulate access. Extra-organizational actors who exercise
some control over these contextual forces have the potential to shape the goals of lob-
bying organizations and, thereby, their definition of the lobby task and their selection
of influence tools.
A key implication of this interpretation is that lobbying success needs to be rede-
fined. Sure, most lobbying is not successful in terms of securing or blocking instru-
ments of public policy. This is the paradox of lobbying. But much of lobbying is
probably not about securing or blocking specific laws or regulations. It may well be
about maintaining membership rolls or securing access from political elites on other
issues the organization cares about or changing the salience and popularity of the
issue over the long haul or blocking rival interest organizations from relying on the
same issue agenda, membership base, or patrons or any number of other goals, all of
which help the organization survive. If lobbying helps to accomplish these other
goals, it must be counted as successful irrespective of the outcome of a final vote on a
policy proposal.
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In the end, lobbying is far more uncertain, far more socially determined, often
less simply instrumental, and more interesting than is allowed for in the transactions
model’s supermarket of strangers, where each interest organization pursues narrow
and discrete policy commodities while hardly interacting with each other or with
other political actors. This complexity, in and of itself, does not necessitate our
eschewing reliance on relative simple and elegant models of lobbying. Indeed, some-
times very simple models can clarify quite complex reality. But a useful theory in the
sense of accounting for the multi-goal and multi-context nature of lobbying is, I
think, unlikely to be overly simple. The combination of niche and resource depend-
ence theory I have offered is likely to be about as simple as such a theory might get,
and only then by framing the discussion at a very high level of abstraction.
I will end this lecture by taking the opportunity to thank some family, friends,
students, and colleagues from whom I have learned a lot. First in line, of course, are
my parents, Donald and Joanne Lowery, who I am delighted are here today. They had
only two rules for their seven children: find something you really like and work really
hard at it. It seems to have worked.
I had three inspiring teachers – Jack Lynch, Paul Savage, and Charlie Press – whose
evident joy in politics and the scholarly life was contagious. I have had wonderful
colleagues at the University of Kentucky and the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill. Many – Bill Berry, Ruth Hoogland DeHoog, Stan Brunn, Bill Lyons,
Gordon Whitaker, Caryl Rusbult, and Lee Sigelman – became co-authors. My friend
and sometimes colleague Virginia Gray deserves special thanks for teaching me about
the politics of interest representation and forgiving me for leaving Carolina. We are
approaching our 20th anniversary working on organized interests together.
Collaboration is fun and something I look forward to continuing here at Leiden.
Some of my most enjoyable collaborative work has been with some outstanding stu-
dents – Jim Garand, Tom Konda, Sam Bookheimer, Jerry Webster, Jim Cox, Jenny
Anderson, Holly Brasher, Christine Keller, Susan Yackee, Jim Malachowski, Greg
Hager, Matt Fellowes, Andrea McAtee, Adam Newmark, Jenny Wolak, and Eric
Godwin.
Now, to Leiden. I like being here. But I was not surprised by the curiosity of the
undergraduates or the professionalism of the AiOs. I was not surprised to find col-
leagues doing very interesting and important work. This is all as it should be, and it
played a significant role in making Leiden a very attractive setting in which to work. I
was, however, surprised to find that everyone – from the support staff (which is the
most professional of any institution I have been affiliated with), the undergraduate
students, the AiOs, Dean Theo Toonen, the UDs, the UHDs, the other Professors in
our Department, to Chairman Mark Rutgers – has been so open to a new arrival with
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a very different set of career and life experiences, so generous with time and energy
(even to correcting my Nederlands Haiku), and so welcoming. Thank you all, but
special thanks to Willeke van Heyningen. If you enjoy the events following this lec-
ture, it will be due mostly to Willeke’s efforts.
Finally, I thank my wife, friend, collaborator, and fellow adventurer, Professor Caryl
Rusbult. Her professional work as a scholar is on close personal relationships and
how partners help each other realize their individual and collective dreams. I have
been undeservedly fortunate that this is also her consuming hobby
Ik heb gezegd.
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